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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DALE S. PIERRE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision of the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya dismissing appellant's petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus based on appellant's previous 
conviction for the crime of first degree murder and sentence 
of death. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's motion to dismiss was granted on 
appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which was 
:1led in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
~a~e County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
~r~s1dino. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
~c··ell3nt seeks to have the D1strict Court's order 
~~. 1 ,~~ell3nt's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
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reversed and to have this court remand the case to the Third 
Judicial District Court, and to require respondent to file 
responsive pleadings, and to order the district court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing and a hearing on the merits of 
appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEl4ENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Dale S. Pierre, was convicted of 
three counts of first degree murder and two counts of 
aggravated robbery and was sentenced to death. On appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Utah the conviction and sentence 
were upheld in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977). A 
petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court was denied without adjudication on the merits. The 
appellant was resentenced to be executed on Decenber 7, 1978. 
On November 28, 1978, appellant filed a petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the Third District Court (R.2-142). 
Appellant also moved the district court to order a stay 
of execution (R.l43). The appellant's petition raised 
questions involving Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 
of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth, Eighth, and 
F~urteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
(R.3-9). A hearing on the motion was set for November 29, 
1978, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya. At that time 
respondent made a ~otion to dism1ss rR.l~~l The ~rounds 
st3ted 1n the ~otion to d~s~1ss ~ere: 
-~-
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1. Petitioner may not, by writ of 
habeas corpus, raise issues that were or 
could have been raised in his direct appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Pierre, 
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977). 
2. Prosecutorial discretion in 
charging a capital felony is permissible 
under recent rulings of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
3. All issues raised by petitioner 
which were addressed in prior pleadings 
were answered by the State of Utah either 
in its brief to the Utah Supreme Court or 
in its brief in opposition to petitioner's 
petition for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court and adequately disposed of 
such issues on the merits. (R.l44) 
After hearing argument on the motions, Judge Sawaya 
granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition and 
denied the appellant's motion for stay of execution (R.l58). 
The district court judge issued a memorandum decision in 
which the reason for its rulings was given. 
It is the opinion of the Court that 
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
filed herein raises no issue of fact or 
law material to determination of the 
legality and constitutionality of the 
conviction, confinement or sentence of 
the Petitioner which were raised on appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
(R.l50). 
Later that afternoon a notice of appeal was filed 
in the district court and Justice Maughan ordered a stay of 
execution. That order was overruled by this court by a 
v0te of 4 to l and the question of the stay of execution 
~as s~• for hearino before the entire court on December 4, 
0 '~ ~~·~r hearina 3raument on the question of the stay 
-3-
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of execution, this court ordered a stay of execution because 
an appeal is pending before the court. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED 
THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT RAISED ISSUES 
THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT 
APPEAL, THESE ISSUES INVOLVED FACTS NOT AVAIL-
ABLE AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL AND ISSUES THAT 
AROSE FROM THIS COURT'S OPINION IN THE DIRECT 
APPEAL, AND ISSUES THAT AROSE FROM RECENTLY 
DECIDED CASES BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT. 
The sole reason that the trial court gave in its 
memorandum decision for dismissing the appellant's petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was that the appellant had failed 
to raise any issue of law or fact that was not or could not 
have been raised on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. This 
statement is clearly erroneous for several reasons. First 
of all, a number of issues raised in appellant's petition 
resulted from this court's decision in State v. Pierre, 
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977). Secondly, other issues arose 
as a result of opinions issued by the United States Supreme 
Court in cases decided either while the Supreme Court of 
Utah had the appellant's previous appeal under advisement 
or after the opinion in State v. Pierre, supra, was issued. 
Thirdly, the appellant and his co-defendant were the first 
persons sentenced to death under the new statutory scheme 
enacted in 1973. S1nce that t1~e. factu3l cuestions about 
-~-
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capital punishment have arisen. Finally, the state of the 
law with respect to capital punishment in the United States 
is very technical and some issues simply were not apparent 
until the law had been extensively studied by commentators 
and counsel. 
State v. Pierre, supra, is the first case to raise 
the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment 
in Utah after the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, reh. den., 429 u.s. 878 (1976). 
The court's opinion in State v. Pierre, supra, like most 
appellate decisions opened a number of new issues which to 
date remain unanswered in Utah. The appellant raised these 
issues in his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The issues 
resulting from the Court's opinion in State v. Pierre, supra, 
include points 12(a)l, 2, 4, and 5 of appellant's petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (R.5-7). These points involve the 
discretion that the sentencing authority has in imposing the 
death penalty, the need for specification of the aggravating 
circumstances which the sentencing authority found to exist, 
the guidance given to the sentencing authority in reaching 
the decision of whether or not to impose the death penalty, 
and the nature and scope of appellate review in capital cases. 
Issues with respect to the burden of proof to be applied at 
~he sentencino phase also arose out of the ruling in State 
~l"'rre., supr3, 1nd '"'ere raised by appellant in his petition 
c., '.'irt~ of Habeas Corpus in points 12(g), (h), and (i) (R.B) · 
-5- d 
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During the pendency of the appeal in the case of 
State v. Pierre, supra, significant changes took place in the 
United States in the law with respect to capital punishment. 
After the appellant had submitted his original brief in State 
v. Pierre, supra, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, supra, Proffitt v. Florida, 
428 U.S. 242 reh. den., 429 u.s. 875 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262 reh. den., 429 U.S. 875 (1976), Stanislaus 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 u.s. 325 reh. den., 429 u.s. 890 
(1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
A short amended brief was submitted by the appellant that 
dealt with these cases. Cases that were decided after the 
state had submitted its brief in State v. Pierre, supra, 
included Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), Harry 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), and Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). None of these cases were 
included in the briefs for either party in State v. Pierre, 
supra, nor were they mentioned by this court in its opinion 
in that case, finally, after the opinion by this court in 
State v. Pierre, supra, was issued the United States Supreme 
Court decided Lockett v. Ohio, l'. s. , 57 L.Ed 2d 973 
(1978), and Bell v. Ohio, u.s. , 57 L .:Cd 2d 1010 (1978). 
Specific issues raised 1n appellant's petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus arose out of these cases. In "ardner 
v . Flo r i d 3 , sup r 3. , 3 d. e ~end 2 r. ': ·.,·u.s :ct....: :1 d .:;- u i l t ~ · ::-: : i r s t 
deoree murder and the 1ur~· r~~cm~e~~ed 3 l:~e se~~e~-e but 
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the judge ordered the death penalty on the basis of a con-
fidential pre-sentence report. The Supreme court held that 
the refusal to disclose the contents of the report and grant 
him the opportunity to explain or deny the statements con-
stituted a denial of due process. Points 12(a)2 and 3 
(R.6) which deal with the pleading and notice of aggravating 
circumstances arose from the Court's ruling in Gardner v. 
Florida, supra. 
In Coker v. Georgia, supra, the Supreme court held 
that it is cruel and unusual to impose the sentence of death 
for the crime of rape. In doing so a majority of the court 
agreed on a test and method of analysis for determining what 
is cruel and unusual punishment with respect to the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society. This test and analysis opened the issue of the 
constitutionality of the methods of imposing capital punish-
ment in Utah which was raised in point 12 (d) (R. 7) of 
appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Under this 
new test and analysis the issue of the method of the imposition 
of the death penalty can now be raised even though the United 
States Supreme court approved of these methods over one 
hundred years ago in ~lilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. 5. 130 (1878). 
Finally, In Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Bell v. 
=!-,l~. surra, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio ca;Jital 
,,-,=h~~~t statutes were unconstitutional because they 
:_:-L' -,-:_1-l'lt~ng c1rcumstances that a sentencing 
-7-
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authority could consider before deciding whether or not to 
impose the death penalty. However, Mr. Justice White in 
his concurring opinion concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it allowed the imposition of the 
death penalty without a finding that the defendant possessed 
a purpose to cause the death of the victim. Point 12(c) 
(R.7) of appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
arose out of the concurring opinions expressed by Mr. Justice 
White in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Bell v. Ohio, supra. 
Several of the issues raised in the appellant's 
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus lacked a factual basis 
that could have been developed at the time of trial. These 
issues relate to the pattern and practice of the prosecution 
of capital felonies and administration of the death penalty. 
Point 12(b) of appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
(R.7) raises the question of the pattern and practice of 
prosecution of capital felonies. Point 12(e) (R.7-8) raises 
the question of arbitrary and capricious administration of 
the death penalty. Point 12(f) raises the question of 
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution of capital cases. 
Since the appellant and his co-defendant were some of the 
first persons to be sentenced to death under the new statutory 
scheme, the factual basis for full litigation of these question 
was insufficient at the time o~ trial ~hen the record for the 
previous appeal was made. Thus, ~~ll and ~a1r l:t1~at1on of 
such ~uestions was net av3~l3ble co the 3~cell~nt at the t1me 
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of trial. 
As has just been shown, all of the issues raised 
in the appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arose 
either from facts unavailable to appellant at the time of 
his conviction or from cases that were neither briefed by 
the parties nor mentioned in the court's opinion in~ 
v. Pierre, supra, or from the opinion in that case itself. 
Since this case involves the imposition of the death penalty 
under state law, it should naturally follow that the state 
courts be the first courts to decide these very important 
issues. This case must be remanded to the district court 
so that a proper record may be made to enable this court to 
rule upon these issues, which as has been shown, could not 
have been raised on direct appeal to this court from the 
conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED 
IN UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES VIOLATES 
APPELLANT'S FOURTEENTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS BECAUSE THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS IMPER-
MISSIBLY SHIFTED TO THE DEFENDANT, THE 
SENTENCING AUTHORITY IS ALLOWED TO EXERCISE 
UNGUIDED DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE 
OF DEATH, AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IS MADE MANDATORY UPON A FINDING OF 
GUILT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The appellant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1973 as amended).~/ 
To be found guilty of this offense the State has to prove 
1/ 76-5-202. Murder in the first degree.--(1) Criminal 
homicide constitutes murder ~n the first degree if the 
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
(a) The homicide was committed by a prisoner who is 
confined in a jail or other penal institution regardless of 
whether such confinement is legal. 
(b) At the time the homicide was committed the actor 
also committed another homicide. 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death 
to a person other than the victim and the actor. 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit, aggravated 
robbery, robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual 
assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, 
aggravated kidnaping or kidnaping. 
(e) The homicide was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing an arrest by a peace officer acting 
under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting 
an escape from lawful custody. 
(f) The homic~de was committed for pecuniarj' or other 
personal gain. 
(g) After having previously been convic:ed o~ ~irst 
or second degree murder. 
(h) The hom1cide was committed ~or the 9urpase of 
preventing a witness from t~st1f~·1~~, or 3 ?ersor1 ~rom pro-
Vldlno e\·idence, r J persor-: ~::-.:rn ~:1r-:. ~·== ~ 1': i_:;,:; 1:: sn·:· leca.l 
proceedinas or of 121al ~~,;~st~~~t~on 
(2) 'lurder n the f~rst decree 1s c c'l: ~"3~ ::ce:;scc. 
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that a defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of another under one of the seven specified circumstances. 
Since these circumstances are elements of the crime of murder 
in the first degree, due process requires that the State has 
to prove the existence of at least one of these circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
These circumstances distinguish murder in the first from 
murder in the second degree. State v. Pierre, supra.~/ 
2/ 76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.--(1) Criminal 
homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the 
actor: 
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes 
the death of another; or 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; or 
(d) While in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission 
of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or 
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated 
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping or kidnaping, causes 
the death of another person other than a party. 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of the 
first degree. 
This difference was described in State v. Pierre, supra. 
The critical difference between murder in the 
first and second degrees is that the former requires 
the actor to cause intentionally and knowingly the 
death of another under aggravated circumstances while 
the latter requires an intentional and knowing death 
or the commission of listed acts of aggravation which 
~Ause death or recklessness with a depraved indifference 
to human life-which eventuates in death. First degree 
~urder 1n br1ef requires a conJoining of "intentional 
~rd ~~=~tna'' ~lth enumerated acts but second degree 
muc8ec ·s srec1f1ed in the dislunctive, thereby not 
:~.:.Lrl~.: '::C'l~s un1on. 572 P.2d at 1354. [emphasis by 
"'tee :.:·ur•j . 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These very same circumstances are the aggravating 
circumstances that the jury considers in its determination 
to impose the death penalty, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207 (1973 
as amended).~/ Although that statute does not provide for 
II 76-3-207. Capital felony--Hearing on sentence.--(!) 
When a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony, 
there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury 
on the issue of penalty. The proceedings shall be conducted 
before the court or jury which found the defendant guilty, 
provided the defendant may waive hearing before the jury, 
in which event the hearing shall be before the court. In 
these proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any matter 
the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, history, mental and 
physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems 
to have probative force may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The 
state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to 
present argument for or against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Mitigation circumstances shall include the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under 
the substantial domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement 
of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental 
disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs; 
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by another person and his participation was 
relatively minor; 
(g) Any other fact in rnit1~ation of the penalty. 
(2) The court Dr Jur::·, 3S t'1e case rnay ce, shall retire 
to cons1der the penalt~. In 3ll ~rDceedi~as before a ~ury, 
under this section, .:;_t shall r--e ~nstru,_:~ed 3S ':':· the punlsh-
ment to be 1mposed ~~en a unan~~ous ~erd~~t ~~r 10ath and 
-l2-
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any standard of proof, this court held that the State had 
the burden of proving that a defendant's acts warrant the 
death penalty. The standard given was that the aggravating 
circumstances must outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
State v. Pierre, supra. The reasons that the court qave 
for requiring this standard rather than the reasonable doubt 
standard in sentencing were that it would make it nearly 
impossible in certain situations for the prosecutor to meet 
the reasonable doubt burden, and secondly, in the guilt 
phase at least one of the aggravating circumstances had been 
proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The effect of this low burden of proof and the 
Utah statutory scheme is threefold. First of all, in the 
3/ (continued) 
that to be imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is not 
found. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose 
the sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury 
and shall impose the sentence of death. If the jury is 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence 
of death, the court shall discharge the jury and impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
(3) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence 
is of death, the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial error 
in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence 
of death and remand the case to the trial court, in which 
event the trial court shall impose the sentence of life 
1mprisonment. 
(4) I~ the event the death penalty in a capital felony 
is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah supreme court or 
~he United States supreme court, the court having jurisdiction 
~vcr a person previously sentenced to death for a capital 
f~lonv sholl cause such oerson to be brouqht before the ccur~. 3nd ~he court sha~l sentence the p~rson to life imprison-
mu~t. and 3r o~rson who is thereafter convicted of a capital 
~~lo~· sh3ll·t~ sente~ced to life imprisonment. 
-13-
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sentencing phase of the trial, the burden of proving that 
the death penalty must not be imposed is placed on the 
defendant. Secondly, the burden of proof is so low that it 
does not prevent mistakes in the application of the death 
penalty, and it gives no guidance to the discretion of the 
sentencing authority in its decision to impose the death 
penalty or sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. 
Finally, in certain situations, such as the case at hand, 
the low burden of proof makes the imposition of the death 
penalty mandatory after a finding of guilt for murder in 
the first degree. 
A. 
The Burden of Proving Facts Which 
Distinguish Those Who May L1ve From Those 
Who Must Die is Impermissibly Shifted to 
the Convicted Defendant Under Utah Capital 
Sentencing Procedures. 
In State v. Pierre, supra, this court held that the 
burden of proving that a defendant convicted of a capital 
offense is to be sentenced to death is on the State. That 
burden is met if the evidence that the state presents out-
weighs the evidence presented by the defendant. The Utah 
statutory scheme requires that one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances must be proved to exist beyond a reasonable doubt 
before the defendant can be convicted of the capital felony 
of murder in the flrst degree Consequently, the State has 
proven the existe~ce o~ all the ne2essar~· a~~~3\"3tl~g c1r-
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sentencing phase. It must be assumed that the proof of 
these circumstances are given great weight by the jury because 
if the jury does not find that one of these circumstances 
exists the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense 
of murder in the second degree which is not a capital felony. 
In other words, the sentencing authority is aware that the 
legislature has given great weight to the proof of the 
existence of these circumstances because once proved to be 
a part of the offense there must be a hearing to determine 
if the defendant is to be sentenced to death rather than a 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
The practical effect is that the state has proved 
the existence of a fact of great weight, and to prevent an 
execution, convicted defendants must present enough evidence 
to meet or outweigh the gravity that has been attached to the 
proof of one of the aggravating circumstances--he must prove 
the existence of a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The miticating circumstances described in Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-207 (1973)i_/ are all of a factual nature 
(crlminal history, diminished capacity, duress, insanity, 
~·outh, 'lnd ?icarious liability). These are all the same 
t~ca of f3ctors that are required to be proved or disproved 
:c•_·- -,t,ote 3, supra. 
-lS-
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beyond a reasonable doubt in determining guilt or innocence 
in our system of justice, Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 u.s. 684 
(1975). This is because they involve the same processes 
and risks of error as are involved in any other factual 
determination in our criminal justice system. The only 
functional distinction between facts to be proven at trial 
and the facts at issue in sentencing is that where at least 
one aggravating circumstance has been proven to exist in 
a capital case, the determination of the existence of a miti-
gating circumstance means the difference between a mandatory 
death penalty and a chance for life. 
The primary reason for requiring the high standard 
of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases is 
because when the defendant has at stake interests of trans-
cending value--his liberty or his life--there is a great 
need to reduce the chance of factual error and this is done 
by requiring the State to meet a very high standard of proof. 
In re Winship, supra. This standard has not been limited 
solely to those facts which define the elements of a crime, 
but it is to be applied to those distinctions which reflect 
the degree of culpability in a criminal act. Mullaney v. 
Wilber, supra. The interest at stake here is of the most 
transcending value known to an:,· person-- his very existence. 
The Un1ted States Su~re~e Court ha~ recoanized 
-J..o-
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of death and one of life imprisonment and that "there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in 
a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 
u.s. at 305 (plurality opinion). Since the Utah capital 
punishment procedures effectively shift the burden of proof 
to the defendant, the protection of the reliability of 
factual determinations has been disguarded, and the need 
for reliability in the imposition of the death penalty 
has likewise been disguarded. 
Not only do the Utah statutes impermissively shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant, but the burden placed 
on the defendant is greater than that placed on the state in 
the guilt phase of the trial. As has previously been 
described, the same circumstances to be shown to exist to 
prove murder in the first degree are to be used to prove 
that the death penalty is to be imposed. Since the standard 
of proof of the aggravating circumstance required in the guilt 
phase of a capital trial is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
there will be nothing that the state has to present in the 
sentencing phase of a trial. This is because the state's 
evidence 1n sentencing need merely outweigh the defendant's 
ev1dence. In other words, the defendant must present evidence 
sufficient to prevent the state's evidence from outweighing 
h1s c•"ldercc. Loqic dictates the conclusion that if this 
·~ • · b~ jone, the defendant must prove the existence of 
-17-
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mitigating circumstances either to be of the same or greater 
weight than the aggravating circumstances that have already 
been proved. This means that the standard to be met in proving 
mitigating circumstances will be either beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or something greater than beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Such a shift in the burden of proof clearly violates the 
Supreme court's holdings in In re Winship, supra, and in 
Mullaney v. Wilber, supra, and in Patterson v. New York, 
432 u.s. 197 (1977). 
B. 
The Low Standard of Proof Required in 
Utah Capital Sentencing Procedures Imper-
missibly Allows the Sentencing Authority 
to Exercise Unguided Discretion ~n Sentencing 
a Convicted Defendant to Death. 
The standard of proof in a capital sentencing phase 
in Utah is so low that it gives a judge or jury virtually 
unlimited discretion in imposing the death penalty, thus 
violating the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. The 
standard of proof of facts in a lawsuit will influence the 
frequency of error in the determination of those facts. 
With a higher standard there is a lower possibility of error, 
Speiser v. Randall, 359 U.S. 513 (1958). The interests 
requiring the need for the high standard of proof in criminal 
cases (and the resulting lower possibility of error) were 
descr1bed in In re Winship, supra. The first is the interest 
of the accused 1n his liberty cr ~s in t~e c~se at hand, 
-~3-
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second interest is to prevent the dilution of the moral force 
of the criminal law by applying a standard of proof that leaves 
citizens in doubt whether innocent people are being condemned 
or executed. The final interest is that of a free society in 
allowing people to go about their ordinary affairs with 
confidence that the government is not going to adjudge them 
guilty of criminal offenses without utmost certainty. 
With a low standard of proof, such as the "weight 
of the evidence" standard, there is a very low degree of 
subjective certainty that the fact finder is required to 
have. With a lower degree of subjective certainty, as had 
been described previously, there is a higher probability of 
factual error, In re Winship, supra. This is because there 
simply is not enough certainty required of the jury in the 
standard to guide the jury's discretion in making factual 
determinations. With a low standard of proof, whim, caprice, 
discriminatory attitudes and other arbitrary factors are 
allowed to enter into the fact finder's decisions resulting 
in the factual errors described in In re Winship, supra. 
In the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the 
sentencing authority's discretion must be directed so that 
its attention is focused on the particular circumstances 
cf the ~r1~e and on the individual character of the defendant. 
~h~ ~~~t~~c1~a authority's discretion must also be guided 
s 33 t, el1minate arbitrariness and capriciousness in its 
:~cr~la, supra, Prof~~tt v. Florida, supra, 
-19-
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Jurek v. Texas, supra, Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 
Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, spura, Harry Roberts v. 
Louisiana, supra. 
As has been shown, in Utah the standard of proof 
to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty is 
"the weight of the evidence." This standard was applied to 
the appellant in his criminal trial. This standard is too 
low to give the guidance to the sentencing authority's 
discretion, required by the Eighth Amendment, in determining 
whether or not the death penalty is to be imposed. Because 
this low sta~dard allows incredibly wide discretion on the 
part of the sentencing authority, arbitrariness and capri-
ciousness will undoubtedly play a part in the imposition of 
the death penalty in any given case. Such unguided discretion 
was the principal cause of those problems that led to the 
United State Supreme Court's holdings in Furman v. Georgia, 
supra. 
c. 
The Utah Capital Sentencing Procedures 
Violate the Cruel and Unusual Punlshment 
Clause of the E1ghth Amendment Because 
Under Certa1n Clrcumstances the Impos1tion 
of the Death Penaltv W1ll be Mandatorv 
Upon a F1nd1ng of G~llt. · 
The Utah capital punishment statutes allow for 
the mandatory impos1t10n of the death penalty in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. As had bee~ descr1bed above, the 
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degree from murder in the second degree are the same circum-
stances required to be proved to impose the death penalty. 
Due process requires that the existence of such circumstances 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, supra. 
This means that the State need not prove anything in the 
sentencing phase of the trial. If the defendant has little 
or no evidence to present, the imposition of the death 
sentence will be mandatory because the State need only prove 
that the death penalty is to be imposed by the weight of 
the evidence. The judge or jury will be given no leeway to 
further consider either the particular circumstances of 
the crime or the character of the individual defendant as 
required by Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and its companion cases. 
Such a mandatory imposition of the death penalty upon a 
finding of guilt of a crime is prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, Stanislaus 
Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 
supra. 
The fact that these circumstances provided a very 
narrow definition of the kind of offense that subjects a 
defendant to the death penalty is constitutionally immaterial. 
That was the exact situation which the Supreme Court held 
to violate the Eighth Amendment in Stanislaus Roberts v. 
LGU~s1ana, supra. This situation is unique to Utah because 
~·lh 1s the only state where the standard of proof in the 
-21-
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5/ 
capital sentencing phase is so low.- Furthermore, Utah is 
the only jurisdiction where the requirements to prove the 
substantive elements of the capital offense are the same 
as the aggravating circumstances needed to be proven to 
sentence an offender to death. 
This is what happened in the case at hand. The 
State needed to put on only minimal evidence in sentencing 
because the aggravating circumstance or circumstances had 
been proved to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant 
had nothing of an exceptional nature that he could show in 
his background. He was in the Air Force and until this 
incident he had led a fairly unnoticed life. With the low 
standard of proof, the imposition of the death penalty was 
mandatory upon a finding of guilt. 
5/ The vast majority of jurisdictions require proof of the 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: 
Cal. Penal Code §190.3 (Supp. 1977); 11 Del. Code Ann. 
§4209 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ga. Code Ann. §26-3102 (1976 Supp.); 
Idaho Code §19-2515 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ill, Rev. State c 38 
§9-1 (1973); 16 Ky. Rev. Stat. §532.025 (Supp. 1977); Vernon's 
Mo. Stat. Ann. §565.012 (Supp. 1977); 21 Okla. Stat. Ann. 
§701.10 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-2404 (Supp. 1977); 
Vernon's Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-1976); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-54.2 (L977 Wyo. Sess.) 
The aggravating circumstance must be proved to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 
(Page Spec. Supp. 1973). 
Statutes with some other standard of proof or an un-
specified standard of proof include: Ala. Code §13-11-2 
(1975 Supp.) (unspecified standard); Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. 
§13-452 (Supp. 1973) (unspecified standard); Gen. Stat. 
Conn. §53a -56a (Supp. 1977) (unspecified standard); Mont. 
Rev. Codes Ann. §94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1973) 
(unspecified); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2522 (Cum. Supp. 1974) 
(Sufficient aggravat1nc c1rcumstances to JUStlfv death 
pena1t:r·); Nev. Rev. Stat. §::C00.030 (l.973) (uns;::ecl:'led standard. 
In Flor1da the facts suocest1nq a sentence of death 
should be so c:e3r a~d cc~vl;~~~~ ~;2- ·---~~~31:·.· ~= re23~nable 
person could d1::er, Ted~e~ ·:. __ _i':_~-~-' 3=2 So. ::~Or),~ ~1?...,':\. 
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POINT III 
IT IS BOTH UNCONSCIONABLE AND A DENIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY 
WHEN THERE ARE UNRESOLVED LEGAL AND FACTUAL 
ISSUES PENDING IN A CASE. THIS IS BECAUSE 
OF TP.E FINALITY AND QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE SENTENCE OF DEATH MID A SENTENCE 
OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides, "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless, in the case of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety requires it." Although this 
right may not be suspended, this court has placed severe 
limitations on its application. In Bryant v. Turner, 19 
Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), the court stated: 
We do not mean to say that the time 
honored writ of habeas corpus does not have 
a very important and useful purpose in our 
law. But that purpose is not to review a 
final judgment arrived at through regular 
proceedings and due process of law by a court 
having jurisdiction. The writ is, as our 
rules describe it, an extraordinary writ, 
to be used to protect one who is restrained 
of his liberty where the requirements of the 
law have been so ignored or distorted that 
the party is substantially and effectively 
denied what is included in the term due 
process of law, or where some other such 
circumstance exists that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to re-examine the con-
viction." [footnotes omitted] 431 P.2d 121, 
122-123. 
This standard has been repeatedly upheld, the most 
:~e>::(C~t: ,-'ise l:l •..:h1ch 1t was is \_'lebster~v. Jones, 587 P.2d 
~ith respect to the case at hand the 
-23-
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However, all the claims which the appellant raised involved 
violation of his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights of the 
United States Constitution. The rights guaranteed in both 
of these amendments have been applied to the states by means 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.~ 
Since all of these claims involve denials of due process the 
only thing that could prohibit their consideration by means 
of habeas corpus is the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
which was discussed above. 
The state may emphasize the fact that such claims 
could have been raised on direct appeal and argue that to 
allow such cla1ms to be raised by means of writ of habeas 
corpus a defendant may save issues by not raising them on 
direct appeal and thus extend the already lengthy time of 
litigation. Such an argument is without merit. On an appeal 
from a criminal conviction, a defendant is usually asking 
for a new trial or reduction of his sentence. By not raising 
an issue on direct appeal so that it may be raised in habeas 
corpus the defendant may be precluding himself from receiving 
immediate relief. That means that the litigation will be 
continued at a great cost, both economic and emotional, to 
6/ The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held to be 
applicable to the states in Gideon v. \·lainwriqht, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963); in Sheppard v. '!axweir;---·:Js:f-~333 (1966), 
the Sixth .~endment guarantee of a fair trial was held 
applic3.ble to the states; 3:-:d ?obinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (19621, 3pp:!.ied ::he ~rotect!"ns o:' the cruel and 
unusual punishment 2l::1.use of t~~e ::~ -~:-.·->. _.::...r.er.c3:ne:Jt.. 1:'J tb.e 
states. 
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himself. It further means that he may have to suffer the 
impact of a criminal sentence before he is able to receive 
the relief which he is entitled to. 
The case law, as cited above, also allows habeas 
corpus review if it would be unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. Anytime that a person's life is at stake 
due to a sentence of death, it would be unconscionable for 
a court not to examine viable and legitimate legal issues 
which may preclude the imposition of that sentence. The 
central theme of Gregg V. Georgia, supra, and its companion 
cases is that there is a gualitative difference between the 
death penalty and any other criminal sentence and the courts 
have a duty to insure reliability before such a sentence 
may be imposed. This point was most eloquently stated by 
Mr. Justice Stewart in the plurality opinion in Woodson v. 
North Carolina, supra, where he stated: 
This conclusion rests squarely on the 
predicate that the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its 
finality, differs more from life imprisonment 
than a hundred-year prison term differs from 
one of only a year or two. Because of the 
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding 
difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate 
punlshment in a specific case. [footnote 
omitted] 4 2 8 U.S. 2 8 0, 3 0 5. 
~r. Justice Stevens stressed the importance of this 
''3r:-:l:-.er \'. Florida, supra, 
-23-
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Five members of the Court have now 
expressly recognized that death is a different 
kind of punishment from any other which may 
be imposed in this country. Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 u.s. 153, 181-188, (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see id., at 231-241 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. at 286-291, (Brennan, J., concurr~ng), 
306-310, (Stewart J., concurring), 306-310, 
(Stewart, J., concurring), 306-310; see id., 
at 314-371, (Marshall, J., concurring). From 
the point of view of the defendant, it is 
different in both its severity and its finality. 
From the point of view of society, the action 
of the sovereign in taking the life of one of 
its citizens also differs dramatically from 
any other leg~timate state action. It is of 
vital importance to the defendant and to the 
community that any decision to impose the 
death sentence be, and appear to be, based 
on reason rather than caprice or emotion. 
430 c.:.s. 349, 357-358. 
And that point was most recently reiterated in 
Lockett v. Ohio, supra, when Chief Justice Burger noted 
that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from 
any other sentence. Writing for the court he stated: 
We are satisifed that this qualitative 
difference between death and other penalties 
calls for a greater degree of reliability when 
the death sentence is imposed, 571 L.Ed. 2d 
973, 989. 
Because of this irreversibility it is unconscionable 
for a court to allow a man to be sentenced to death when there 
are legal or factual issues which after consideration on the 
merits would entitle him, as a habeas cor~us petitioner, 
to a new trial or to a reduct1on in the sentence of death 
to one of l1fe 1m~r1sonment. The tvp1c~l 1nnate who either 
is precL.1ded ~, ~3L~t'.J3l issues 
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as a probationary sentence rather than incarceration, 
additional privileges while incarcerated, or an early 
release from incarceration by means of parole. None of 
these forms of relief, however, are available to a person 
sentenced to die. Once that sentence is carried out all 
other questions of sentencing alternatives or a new trial 
become moot. 
Likewise, the imposition of the death penalty 
with these issues still unresolved would be a denial of 
due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides, " ... nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law." Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides the same guarantee. In the case of In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that due process 
required the reasonable doubt standard to be applied in 
criminal cases. The court held that the standard protects 
an interest of transcending value--a person's liberty--and 
to lose this liberty on the basis of facts that amount to a 
preponderance of the evidence would be fundamentally unfair. 
A person's life is of even more transcending value than his 
llberty, and the Due Process Clause expressly provides that 
a person s~~ll not be deprived of his life without due process 
~f law. To t~ke a person's life when there are unresolved 
~c·::·"~ en:! • ~·t :ol .:ruestions that may preclude such a penalty 
~. ' : , ~l .-,f :undamenta.l fairness than depriving 
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him of his liberty on facts which fail to establish his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in Gardner 
v. Florida, supra, the court relied on the qualitative 
difference between the sentence of death and one of imprison-
ment to reach the conclusion that all the requirements of due 
process be met before a person is sentenced to death. On 
the basis of this qualitative difference, as discussed above 
with respect to the unconscionability of imposing the death 
penalty with legal issues available, due process mandates 
that a convicted defendant in a capital case be allowed to 
fully and fairly litigate all legal issues before the State 
can deprive nim of his life. As discussed above, there 
are such issues in the appellant's case. It will be a 
denial of due process to impose the death penalty without 
resolving these issues. 
Since the appellant in this case was sentenced to 
death, habeas corpus is the final form of relief in the 
state courts that is available to him, this court must remand 
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing 
and a hearing on the merits of the issues raised in appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
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POINT IV 
THE UTAH COURTS IMPROPERLY APPLY RES 
JUDICATA RATHER THAN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO 
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, THUS PRECLUDING 
PETITIONERS FROM RAISING ISSUES THAT COULD 
HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEALi FURTHER-
MORE, THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO EVIDENCE 
BEFORE IT TO DECIDE IF EITHER RES JUDICATA 
OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WERE APPLICABLE IN 
THIS CASE. 
In Utah the Writ of Habeas Corpus is available as 
a constitutional right. Article I, Section 5 of the Con-
stitution of Utah provides, "The privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it." In 
the case of Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 
(1967), this court discussed the purposes of the writ of 
habeas corpus, stating: 
We do not mean to say that the time 
honored writ of habeas corpus does not have 
a very important and useful purpose in our 
law. But that purpose is not to review a 
final judgment arrived at through regular 
proceedings and due process of law by a 
court having jurisdiction. The writ, is, 
as our rules describe it, an extraordinary 
writ, to be used to protect one who is 
restrained of his liberty where there exists 
no jurisdiction or authority. or where the 
requirements of the law have been so ignored 
or distorted that the party is substantially 
and effectively denied what is included in 
the term due process of law, or where some 
other such circumstance exists that it would 
be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. [footnotes omitted) 431 P.2d 
at 122-123. 
The questions which appellant raised in his petition 
::r ~r 1 t :f Habeas corpus all involve substantial state and 
:•.cdsr:il c:nst 1 t:u+:icnal auo>stions. The federal questions 
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involve the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. The state questions involve 
Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. Claims of violations of such constitutional rights 
may properly be raised on habeas corpus so that the courts 
may determine if the petitioner's right to due process has 
been substantially and effectively denied as required by 
Bryant v. Turner, supra. However, this is not to say that 
a petitioner in habeas corpus may continue to raise the same 
issues as he raised on direct appeal. This is because the 
determination of such issues will have barred further con-
sideration at a later date under the doctrines of res judicata 
or collateral estoppel. In Richardson v. Hodson, 26 Utah 
2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971), this court distinguished between 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court stated: 
Strictly speaking, the term "res 
judicata" applies to a judgment between 
the same parties who in a prior action 
litigated the identical questions which 
are present in the later case. Not only are 
the parties bound by the ruling on matters 
actually litigated, but they are also pre-
vented from raising issues which should 
have been raised in the former action. 
The rule of law is wise in that it gives 
finality to judgments and also conserves 
the time of courts, in that courts should 
not be required to relitigate matters which 
have once been fully and finally determined. 
485 P.2d 1044, 1046. 
In that case the court found that because different parties 
were involved in t~e second ~roc~~d1na r~s iudicata, as 
defined, could not te appl1ed. 
to state: 
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A form of res judicata applies to 
situations like this wherein issues which 
are actually decided against a party in a 
prior action may be relied upon by an 
opponent in a later case as having been 
judicially established. This doctrine, 
known as collateral estoppel, differs 
from res judicata not only in the fact 
that all parties need not be the same in 
the two actions, but also in the fact that 
the estoppel applies only to issues actually 
litigated and not to those which could have 
been determined. 485 P.2d at 1046. 
Without actually calling it res judicata this court has 
consistently applied this principle in habeas corpus as 
reflected in the case of Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 
(1976). In that case the court stated that the petitioner 
in habeas corpus "should not be permitted at a later time 
to use habeas corpus to again attack his conviction on 
matters which were either dealt with or could have been 
dealt with at the time for appeal." 547 P.2d 696, 697. 
However, res judicata cannot properly be applied to issues 
that could have been raised in a criminal appeal that are 
subsequently raised on a habeas corpus because the parties 
in a habeas corpus proceeding are different than in a criminal 
proceeding, the burdens of proof are different and the relief 
sought in the two proceedings is different. Consequently, 
collateral estoppel not res judicata must apply in habeas 
cor~us proceedings. Thus the petitioner in habeas corpus 
is orecluded from raising only those issues which were 
3Ct~3ll: lLtiaated in the prior proceeding. 
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This position is reinforced by Rule 65B(i) (2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The portion of that 
rule which deals with prior adjudication of issues rasied 
in habeas corpus provides: 
The complaint shall further state 
that the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has not 
already been adjudged in a prior habeas 
corpus or other similar proceeding; and 
if the complainant shall have instituted 
prior similar proceedings in any court, 
state or federal, within the State of 
Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, 
shall attach a copy of any pleading filed 
in such court by him to his complaint, and 
shall set forth the reasons for the denial 
of rel1ef in such other court. In such 
case, if it is apparent to the court in 
which the proceeding under this Rule is 
instituted that the legality or constitu-
tionality of his confinement has alrea1y 
been adjudged in such prior proceedings, 
the court shall forthwith dismiss such 
complaint, giving written notice thereof 
by mail to the complainant, and no further 
proceedings shall be had on such complaint. 
As can be seen, the rule does not preclude a petitioner 
from raising issues that under some stretch of the imagination 
could have been raised in a prior proceeding. But rather, 
the rule precludes a habeas corpus petitioner only from 
raising issues that have actually been litigated in a prior 
proceeding. In fact, the effect of not allowing a habeas 
corp•Js petitioner from raising issues that could have been 
rasied on direct appeal 1s to completely read Rule 65B(i) 
out of the Utah Rules of C1vil Procedure That rule allows 
denial of :1 substar.tlcl ~cro;c:r·_:r:c·:_ ~ ;:,chc. Such challenqes 
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are always available on direct appeal from the proceedings 
which resulted in his commitment. 
The present state of the Utah law with respect to 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus precludes a potential petitioner 
from raising two types of issues. The first type involve 
obscure constitutional challenges which become more apparent 
after changes in the law by means of new cases. The nature 
of the issues raised is discussed in detail in Point III, 
infra. The second type of issue involves those for which 
the factual basis is lacking at the time of trial or appeal, 
but with the passage of time the factual basis develops. 
This type question was raised by appellant in his claim 
that the pattern and practice of prosecution and administration 
of capital cases is arbitrary and capricious (R.6-9). 
In addition to those elements of collateral estoppel 
which have been described, before a trial court can determine 
whether or not either of those doctrines apply the record 
of the prior proceeding must be before the trial court. In 
Parrish v. Layton City corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (1975), 
this court reversed a trial court's grant of a motion for 
summary judgment based on a claim of res judicata because 
the trial court did not have the record of the prior proceedings 
before it. In the case at hand the attorney general claimed 
that petltioner had not raised any issues of fact or law 
wh1ch were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal 
? ~ ~ J. I ~he tr~al court in reaching its decision agreed 
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with that contention (R.l50). The record in the previous 
case was never introduced into evidence by means of either 
Rule 68(1) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence or by Rule 
44(a) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously 
the trial court has no basi~ on which to rule that no new 
issues of fact or law had been raised. 
The case must be remanded to the trial court for 
further and proper consideration of the issue of collateral 
estoppel. This is because the trial court had no facts 
before i~ ~~ which it could base its decision. Furthermore, 
the Utah case law with respect to the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
improperly applies the standard of res judicata rather than 
collateral estoppel in determining which issues may be raised 
on habeas corpus. In remanding the case to the district 
court this court must order the district court to allow 
the appellant to raise issues that could have been raised 
on direct appeal from his conviction. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
RESPO:-:JUENT 'S MOTION TO DIS~1ISS BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT APPEAR TO A CERTAINTY THAT THERE 
IS :-:10 ST.:\TE OF F.:..CTS WHICH COCLD BE PROVED 
TO SUPPORT THE APPELL.:.~;T' S CL.;I,I'l FOR 
RELIEF. 
_"'}'C"r:::ur:ds. T'"lese 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
grounds were that the issues raised by appellant were or 
could have been raised on appeal, that the law allows the 
prosecution discretion in charging a capital felony and 
finally that all issues raised in the petition had previously 
been addressed and disposed of in this court's ruling in 
State v. Pierre, supra, and in the United States Supreme 
Court's denial of appellant's Writ of Certiorari. Although 
not specifically stated, this motion must have been made 
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. This is because the rules of civil procedure are 
generally applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Bl(a)~/ and Rule 12(b) (6) is the 
only rule which is applicable to respondent's motion. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6)!/ allows 
a court to dismiss an action upon defendant's motion if the 
II Special Statutory Proceedings. These Rules shall apply 
to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such 
Rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a 
statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of 
the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be 
in accordance with these Rules. 
8; How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
resoonsive pleadinq thereto if one is required except that 
the ~ollaw1ng defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
:r:.vico b·· rnot1on: (l) lack of 'iurisdiction over the subject 
'T'c~t:':.er, (2l lack of lUrlsdiction over the person, (3) improper 
•··~:>:c. '~I 1nsuffici~ncv of process, (5) insufficiency of 
s.~r"•,_·-~ :·rC'"c>ss, (fi)- failure to state a claim upon which 
1 
•• • :3'' c" "rv:ted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
~oc ~ ~3Klna 3ny of these defenses shall be made 
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plaintiff's pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Because of the severity of such an action by 
a trial court, this court has strictly construed the require-
ments and limitations of a dismissal pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12(b). In the case of Liquor Control 
commission v. Athas, 121 u. 457 243 P.2d 441 (1952), this 
court reversed a trial court's finding that the complaint 
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted. In doing so the court stated: 
A motion to dismiss should not be 
granted unless it appears to a certainty 
that plaintiff would be entitled to no 
relief under any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of its claim. [citation 
omitted] 243 P.2d 441, 443 
This same principle was stated with approval in Christensen 
v. Lelis Automotive Transmission Service, Inc., 24 Ut. 2d 
165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970) . 
. Y (continued) 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or 
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading 
or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for 
relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve 
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense 
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered {6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary iudgment and disposed of ~s provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be givPn r~asonable opportunity to 
present all materi'll made pert1nenc: to such a mot1on by Rule "' 
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Under this test, the appellant in the case at ban4 
did allege sufficient grounds for the relief requested. ~ 
appellant requested either to be discharged from his con-
finement because he was convicted at a trial during which 
his rights under the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Utah were violated or to be relieved from 
an unconstitutional sentence of death. Such grounds were 
alleged in points 11 and 12 of appellant's petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (R.3-9). It is a simple matter to 
contemplate any number of states of facts which could be 
proved in support of any or all of these claims. On this 
basis, the respondent's motion to dismiss should have been 
denied by the district court, a stay of execution granted 
and the case set for an evidentiary hearing. This court 
must reverse the district court's ruling and remand the 
case for such a hearing. 
POINT VI 
BY RULING THAT THE APPELLANT HAD RAISED 
NO ISSUES OF FACT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN 
RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT 
IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED 
FURTHER ERROR BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT 
TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT CONTRO-
VERTING FACTS. 
An important aspect of a motion pursuant to Rule 
12 r.2) 16) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that such 
3 mot1on cannot, on the court's own initiative, be converted 
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into a motion for summary judgment (pursuant to Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). In Hill v. Grand Central, 
Inc., 25 Ut. 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970), this court reversed 
a district court order which converted a motion to dismiss 
into a summary judgment. The motion to dismiss in that 
case was made pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The court's order denied the defendant's 
motion to dismiss and required the plaintiff to produce 
evidence in support of her allegations within 30 days and 
upon failure to produce such evidence a motion for summary 
judgment would be granted for the defendant. With respect 
to the district court order this court stated: 
True it is that when a motion to dismiss 
is accompanied by affidavits it may be treated 
as a motion for summary judgment, yet the court 
should not on its own initiative try to convert 
a motion for dismissal into one for summary 
judgment. It has no more right to ask the 
plaintiff how he will establish his claim 
than it has to require the defendant to state 
what its defense will be. It would have been 
highly improper for the court, on the motion 
to dismiss, to have given the defendant 30 
days to present proof as to the truth of the 
alleged statement or as to the lack of malice. 
477 P.2d 150, 151. 
It was also emphasized that one of the parties must 
move for summary judgment, not the court on its own initiative. 
The principle that a trial court on its own initiative cannot 
convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment 
was also held to be applicable in Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 
905 (Utah, 1975). In that case. r.cv.e\·er, the court held 
-3S-
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.,~--~.·.··.·_· .. j.< 
. . 
a 
~~ 
that even if the motion for summary judgment wae ~. 
issues of fact were still in dispute so that the grantlag 
of the motion for summary judgment was also improper. 
The most recent case in this jurisdiction on tbie 
principle is Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm PrOduction, 
587 P.2d 151 {Utah, 1978). In that case the plaintiff cla~ 
that defendant owed it money for an overpayment on a secured 
note. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was 
accompanied by affidavits that tended to establish either 
an accurate payoff or accord and satisfaction. Although 
the motion was not denominated as being made pursuant to 
Rule 12{b) {6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial 
court issued a memorandum decision that had the effect of 
treating defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary 
judgment in dismissing the action. The court reversed the 
judgment of the district court because the plaintiff was 
given neither notice nor opportunity to present additional 
materials. In a very similar case, Strand v. Associated 
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 {Utah, 1977), 
not cited in Bekins Bar v Ranch v. Utah Farm Production, 
supra, this court held that the refusal to allow a plaintiff 
the opportunity to make reasonable discovery after a filing 
of 3 motion to dismiss accompanied by an affidavit is improper. 
With respect of that holding, the court stated, 
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It is error to consider a motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, 
without giving the adverse party an 
opportunity to present pertinent material, 
the action of the trial court in denying 
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity 
to present controverting material violated 
the mandate of the rule. [footnote omitted] 
561 P.2d 191, 193. 
The case was remanded to the district court to give 
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity to obtain and present 
appropriate material. This was done because the court felt 
that the district court should have either ordered a con-
tinuance to permit discovery or denied the motion for summary 
judgment without prejudice to its renewal after adequate 
time had elapsed for the plaintiff to obtain the desired 
information. 
The effect of the ruling of the district court 
in the case at bar was to convert the respondent's motion 
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The second 
paragraph of the district court's order which gives its 
reasons for granting respondent's motion states: 
It is the opinion of the court that the 
petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 
herein raises no issue of fact or law material 
to determination of the legality or constitu-
tionality of the conviction, confinement, or 
sentence of the petitioner which were not 
raised or could not have been raised on appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
( R. 150). 
As previouslv d1scussed, this rultng has the effect 
--\1)-
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, 
judicata. To make this determination the trial court had 
to have the record and transcript of the prior action before 
it, Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra. Such materials 
are certainly beyond the scope of the pleadings and consequently, 
under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
appellant would be entitled to present added material to show 
there were new issues of fact and that such issues could not 
have been raised on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. In 
order to uphold such a ruling this court would have to over-
rule that principle which has been upheld in the cases from 
Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., supra, to Bekins Bar V. Ranch 
v. Utah Farm Production, supra. This case must be remanded 
to the district c~urt to give the appellant the opportunity 
to show that res judicata or collateral estoppel is not appli-
cable. 
CONCLUSION 
This case must be remanded to the district court for 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the appellant's 
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. It would be both uncon-
scionable and a denial of due process to impose the death 
penalty when there are unresolved issues of fact and law in 
the appellant's case. Furthermore, the district court order 
dismissing the appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
w~s 1mproper ~or the following reasons: First of all, the 
'~P~ll3nt should have been able to raise issues that could 
-41-
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have been raised on direct appeal from the criminal conviction 
because collateral estoppel, not res judicata, applies to 
habeas corpus proceedings. Secondly, even if the application 
of res judicata was proper the district court lacked an 
evidentiary basis for such a dismissal. Thirdly, it does 
not appear to a certainty that ~here is no state of facts 
which could be proved to support the appellant's claim. 
Fourthly, the district court found that there were no issues 
of fact without giving the appellant the opportunity to 
present controverting facts. Finally, the appellant raised 
issues in his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that could 
not have been raised on direct appeal from his criminal 
conviction. 
DATED this ______ day of February, 1979. 
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